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Abstract
Within this paper we establish the existence of a vNM-Stable Set for (cooperative) linear production games with a continuum of players. The coalitional function is generated by r+1 "production factors" (non atomic measures). r factors are given by orthogonal probabilities ("cornered" production factors) establishing the core of the game. Factor r + 1 (the "centralized" production factor) is represented by a nonantomic measure with carrier "across the corners" of the market; i.e., this factor is more abundantly available and the representing measure is not located within the core of the game.
The present paper continues a series of presentations of this topic, for Part I,II,III see [1] , [2] , [3] .
We focus on convex vNM-Stable Sets of the game and we present an existence theorem valid for "Large Economies" (the term is not quite orthodox). There are some basic assumptions for the present model which enable us to come up with a comprehensive version of an existence theorem. However, in order to make our presentation tractable (and readable) we wisely restrict ourselves to a simplified model. As in our previous models there is a (not necessarily unique) imputation outside the core such that the vNM-Stable Set is the convex hull of this imputation and the core. Significantly, this additional imputation can be seen as a truncation of the "centralized" distribution, i.e., the r + 1 st production factor. Hence there is a remarkable similarity mutatis mutandis regarding the Characterization Theorem that holds true for the "purely orthogonal case" ( [4] , [5] ).
Section 1: Notations and Definitions
1 Notations and Definitions
Within this paper we present a general existence theorem for convex vNMStable sets for a Semi Orthogonal Game as introduced in [1] and continued in [2] and [3] .
There are some restrictions imposed on the model which are essentially minor. In the present model, the centralized production factor is available in sectors D τ of equal size, in other words, the quantities λ τ = λ(D τ ) (τ ∈ T) are supposed to be equal, i.e., λ τ = 1 t
(τ ∈ T).
We use definitions and notations as provided in [1] , [2] and previously in [4] and [5] . the reader familiar with this setup may well skip this introductory section . Thus, we consider a (cooperative) game with a continuum of players, i.e., a triple (I, F, v) where I is some interval in the reals (the players), F is the σ−field of (Borel) measurable sets (the coalitions) and v (the coalitional function) is a mapping v : F → Ê + which is absolutely continuous w.r.t. the Lebesgue measure λ. We focus on "linear production games", that is, v is described by finitely many measures λ ρ , (ρ ∈ {0, 1, . . . , r}) via . Accordingly, we choose the player set to be I := [0, r). The carriers C ρ = (ρ − 1, ρ] (ρ = 0, . . . , r) of the measures λ ρ are the "cartels" commanding commodity ρ. Further details of our notation are exactly those presented in [1] .
In particular, the measure λ 0 , (λ 0 (I) > 1) is assumed to have a piecewise constant density
• λ 0 w.r.t λ. To this end we consider some family {D τ } τ ∈T ρ that constitutes a partition of the carrier C ρ of λ ρ such that τ ∈T ρ D τ = C ρ . λ 0 has constant density h τ on each D τ .
For completenes we repeat the basic definitions of our solution concept, the vNM-Stable Set (von Neumann-Morgenstern [6] ). see also the Part I,II,III, i.e., [1] , [2] , [3] . and if • there is no pair ξ, μ ∈ S such that ξ dom μ holds true ( "internal stability").
• for every imputation η / ∈ S there exists ξ ∈ S such that ξ dom η is satisfied ( "external stability").
The discrete nature of the density of λ 0 carries some implications for the establishment of dominance based on discrete analogues of concepts like imputations, coalitions etc. We refer to these analogues as "pre-concepts". Again see Part 1, i.e., [1] for the details.
The Uniform Model
We simplify the shape of the density • λ 0 as follows. We assume that the underlying partition is uniform in the sense that
holds true, in other words, each carrier C ρ is partitioned into t pieces of equal Lebesgue measure such that
As a consequence, for some vector x ∈ Ê rt + and the generated imputation ϑ x , we have
hence the set of pre-imputations is slightly simplified to be
In what follows, we shall refer to the sequences τ as to be the undercutting if ρ∈R h τρ < 1 and overstepping if ρ∈R h τρ ≥ 1 . 
the/a minimizing sequence, i.e., the sequence with minimal sum
That is,
∨
T is the set of all indices that belong to some undercutting sequence.
Furthermore let, for
σ ∈ R, (2.8) ∧ T σ := ⎧ ⎨ ⎩ τ ∈ T σ ρ∈R\{σ} h∨ τ ρ + h τ ≥ 1 ⎫ ⎬ ⎭ and put (2.9) ∧ T := σ∈R ∧ T σ .
That is,
∧
T is the set of all indices that appear in overshooting sequences only. 
• τ is a "next minimizing" index, i.e., 
There is
• τ ∈ T as described in Lemma 2.2 such that
holds true.
In what follows we will always assume that we are dealing with a uniform game. Thus, in particular the cases treated by Lemma 2.2 and Theorem 4.9 of Part I in which the core turns out to be the unique vNM-Stable Set, are considered to be settled.
Recall the set of preimputations (2.14)
that serves to provide candidates to generate a vNM-Stable Set. As previously, we will provide a pre-imputation
As a prerequisite we start out by exhibiting a vectorx that resembles the previous candidates for setting up a vNM-Stable Set in Part I,II,III. However, as it turns out,x is in general just a sub pre-imputation and further work is necessary in order to exhibit the pre-imputations 
Then in particular
for any sequence τ with
Remark 2.5. Observe that because of (2.19) and (2.21) we have for σ ∈ R (2.23)
Hence, for any sequence τ involving elements h∨ τ • as well as some x τ for ∧ T σ the sum of all elements will exceed 1, e.g., 
of pre-imputations that cannot be dominated via some separating pre-coalition (SECTION 4 of Part I ). H has been introduced in (4.7.) of Part I (i.e. [1] ) and indeed provides a candidate in the special set-up discussed in Parts II and III. Within the framework establishend in that context, it turned out that H had just one extremal point apart from the vectors e T ρ (ρ ∈ R).
Within this section we will illuminate the general situation in the context of uniform games. We will exhibit all the extremals of H which, in general are finitely many. Of course, all the extremals of the core, i.e., the vectors e T ρ (ρ ∈ R), are extremals of H as well, we mean to specify the remaining ones. To this end, define
That is, H = C(v) equals the pre-core, this is the alternative case mentioned in Lemma 2.2 and excluded by our assumtion about the uniform model. In the uniform case under consideration we have Δ ≥ 0.
We are going to prove that
holds true. Proof: 1 st STEP : According to Remark 2.5 we know thatx satisfies all the inequalities determining H with the exception of the imputation equation
τ ∈T x τ = 1 and possibly non-negativity. As we assume Δ ≥ 0, we know thatx ≥ 0 and hence all thex σ ∈ H (σ ∈ R) are imputations as τ ∈T x τ = 1 results from the construction provided in Definition 3.1.
2
nd STEP :
Now we show that everyx σ is uniquely defined by a set of equations chosen from the inequalities determining H.
Indeed, pick any relevant vector a ⊕ listed in Theorem 3.5 of Part I (i.e. [1] ) and let τ 1 , . . . , τ r denote the non-zero coordinates. Now, to any such relevant vector there appear also the permuted versions, saȳ
with non-zero coordinates at the same positions. Hence there are r equations
satisfied by x τ 1 , . . . , x τ r . The r coordinates involved are not elements of ∨ T. Hence the coordinates along τ 1 , . . . , τ r ofx and the ones of everyx σ coincide, actually they equal the coordinates of h. Thus we have also
Now consider the linear system of equations suggested for the r coordinates under consideration. The coefficient matrix of this system is given by the vectorsā ⊕σ hence it is
The determinant of this matrix is
Hence the linear system of equations (3.8) which involves variable x τ 1 , . . . , x τ r has exactly the solution
These are the coordinates ofx as well as the ones ofx σ for all σ ∈ R.
Consequently, all coordinates of anyx σ for indices τ ∈ ∧ T are uniquely defined by equations resulting from the inequalitites of H.
3
rd STEP :
However, the coordinates in ∨ T ofx are obviously defined by their very definition which involves equations resulting from inequalities of H as described in 
Proof:
We know that the pre-core extremals and the {x σ } σ∈R are extremals of H. We have to show that these are the only extremals of H.
To this end, fix some extremal x of H.
1
st STEP :
. . , , τ r ) be a sequence such that
Let a ⊕ρ be the corresponding separating vectors. The inequalities defining H in context with the sequence τ and the family a ⊕ρ are given by a ⊕ρ x ≥ 1. We write x τ := x |T τ for the coordinates of x restricted to the sequence τ . Then the above inequalities can be described by using the matrix G given by (3.9) in the 2 nd ST EP of the previous proof via
Now, inspect the set
The extremals of this set are given by the projection h τ = h |T τ and the unit vectors e τρ . These unit vectors in turn are the projections of the e T ρ on H τ . Figure 3 .1 indicates the situation.
2
nd STEP : Suppose now, that there are at least two indices σ, σ ∈ R such that there is no equation in the corresponding rows of G, i.e., we have
First assume that x has positive coordinates τ σ , τ σ = x, contradicting our assumption that x is extremal in H.
Next, it could happen that, say x τ 1 = 0. Then (inspect Figure 3. 1) essentially the case that x |τ = te τ 1 for some τ > 1 could pose a problem. Replace τ 1 ∈ T 1 by some τ 1 ∈ T 1 and repeat the argument. Now, not all the τ 1 ∈ T 1 can yield x |τ = t e τ 1 for some t > 1 as it would follow that the total τ ∈T 1 x τ > 1 exceeds 1 and x would not be an imputation. Hence we are either back at the beginning of this step or there is at most one coordinate σ that yields a strict inequality like in (3.11).
3
rd STEP : So now there is at most one coordinate σ that yields a strict inequality like in (3.11), let this be coordinate 1. That is we have
(the coordinates correspond to τ , so a ⊕ρ has the coordinate = 1 at τ ρ ).
Now, again inspecting
one observes that x must be located on an edge of H τ connecting h |T τ and a unit vector e τ 1 ; see again Figure 3.1 .
4
th STEP : Now, by the same argument as used in the second step of the proof of Theorem 3.2, but reduced to the coefficient matrix G with row σ deleted, we find that actually x τρ = h τρ = for ρ ∈ R \ {1} .
Combining we see that x projected to the coordinates of τ is a convex combination of the projections of h and e τ 1 , i.e., for some α, 0 ≤ α ≤ 1, we have (3.15)
Repeat the argument provided in the 2 nd ST EP . Now again, if there is a ("second") inequality a ⊕ρ x > 1, then we see at once that x is not extremal in H. Otherwise we have as previously x τ ρ = h τ ρ . Continuing this way, we find that
.
Then exactly as above we have, for some β > 0,
But the coordinates of x in 
Return to a sequence τ = (τ 1 , . . . , , τ r ) such that (3.20)
as in the 1 st ST EP . We know that
Hence 
Next, the same argument can be applied if instead of τ 1 we replace, say τ 2 , . . . , , τ r ) and referring to (3.21), we have this time
h τρ .
(3.27)
Specifying τ to ∨ τ once again we now obtain -again consulting (2.20) -
Of course a similar argument holds true for ρ ∈ R \ {1, 2}, thus actually
Combining (3.25) and (3.29) we observe that indeed for the coordinates τ ∈ ∧ T we have
i.e., (3.19 ). This concludes the present step. 7 th STEP : In view of (3.30) we can define a nonnegative set of coefficients
using the constand Δ that has been specified in (3.2). Then (3.18) and (3.32) imply (3.33)
As x is an imputation, we have Concluding we come up with
that is, x is a convex combination of the extremal vectors exhibited in Theorem 3.2. As x is assumed to be extremal, this shows that this convex combination must be a trivial one, i.e., x is one of the extremals already known.
q.e.d. As we have seen, the extremals of H apart from those of the core are obtained by constructingx and -as this vector is not a pre-imputation -then distributing the remaining mass Δ in a natural way over ∧ T . That is, we have formula (5.7) which we repeat here:
Now, within this section we exhibit those pre-imputations in H that in additiona are also effective for the relevant vectors of the second type a . This amounts to restricting the distribution of the free mass Δ over the basis vectors
in a suitable way.
We start out by discussing a several examples in detail as this clears the path to the comprehensiv treatment. 
and its twin (0, ε; 1 − ε, 0) as well as (1 − ε, 0; ε, 0) and (0, 1 − ε; ε, 0). There are two relevant vectors of the first type, namely a = (1, 0; , 0, 1) and a = (0, 1; , 0, 1) .
The inequalities resulting, i.e.,
3)
do not in general determine H nor do they imply H = C(v).
However, we have at aonce
hence we find forx the coordinates
As x 4 = 1 − e we observe that this does not yield an imputation, rather the only extremal is obtained from the imputation equation τ ∈T x τ = 2; that is we obtain Considering the relevant vectors a of the first type we obtain the resulting inequalities (4.7)
that is, the coordinates ofx have to satisfy
Consequently all inequalitites involved must be equations. then it follows at once that x 1 = x 2 and x 5 = x 6 .
therefore, unless h 1 = h 2 , the vectors e 123 and e 456 are the only solutions of J (v) to the inequalitiy system above. On the other hand, if we put h 1 = h 2 := ε, then it follows that x 5 = x 6 = 1 − ε; hencex has the shape andx is not only the extremal but also satisfies all inequalities (4.7) with an equation as well as it satisfies the imputation equation τ ∈T x τ = 3 .
• • Example 4.3. A similar occurrence is observed in the following example with ρ = 3 and t = 2. We assume The relevant vectors a of the first type result in inequalities (4.12)
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Again the coordinates ofx have to satisfy
Consequently all inequalitites involved must be equations. Then (unless H equals the core) it follows at once that
Now again the Extremal Characterization Theorem 3.3 tells us that x 3 = h 3 and x 5 = h 5 for the coordinates ofx; hence we come up with
Againx is the extremal of (4.14) H = e 12 , e 34 , e 56 ,x and it satisfies all the equations resulting from relevant vectors a as well as the imputation equation regarding total τ ∈T x τ = 2 .
• •
The above examples show that Δ = 0 may occur in abundance, in which case we have no problem with effectivenes regarding the third type of relevant vectors. The following example shows a different picture. we represent λ 0 by h = (ε, ε, ε, h 4 ; ε, ε, h 7 , h 8 ) .
Then that λ 0 (I) > 1 is guaranteed by
In particular, if we choose 
There are several minimal sequences all of them calling for
with a total sum τ ∈T
Thus,x is not an imputation. We find Δ = 4 − (3 + 2ε) = 1 − 2ε > 0 and hence the three extremals 
The extremalx 8 yields
computing the zeros of the quadratic functin shows that
Section 4: The Effective Pre-Imputations
22
That is, the extremals of H cannot serve for external domination via a for the values 1 5 < ε < 1 3 . However, we are successfull when turning to the barycenter of H. Indeed, let (4.22)
then we obtain (4.23)
which yields (4.24)
In view of the specification (4.17) this is exactly the condition we need for to make sure that • x can be employed for external domination via the relevant vector a . Now within the context of this example, we turn to the general case, i.e., instead of (4.16) we choose
in order to ensure λ 0 (I) > 1 and
in order to ensure (4.28)
as previously. We assume that the minimizing sequence is represented by (h 1 , h 5 ), i.e., Then we obtain
which implies 
allows for a choice of Δ 1 , Δ 2 satisfying (4.40). This way we have found a candidate • x for the third member of a vNM-Stable Set.
• • Based in these considerations we are now in the position to formulate the general theorem. For simplicity we assume h τ = 1 for τ ∈ ∧ T .
Section 4:
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Given the minimizing sequence
∨ τ let (4.46) h σ := ρ∈R\{σ} h∨ τ ρ .
We say that a vector
Theorem 4.6. There exists Proof: Denote
Then, because of λ 0 (I) > 1 we have
Next, using the minimizing sequence ∨ τ and the definition
we have (using some self explaining notation) (4.50)
The total mass is (4.51)
and hence Δ computes to (4.52)
In view of (4.49) we have
Therefore we can choose a set of reals Δ = (Δ ρ ) ρ∈R such that
holds true, that is, we can choose an admissible distribution of mass Δ. Using this distribution we define We may have to consider relevant vectors with corresponding sequences τ that are obtained by permuting the ordering, so that the element say τ r appears in
This problem is obviously solved by replacing r by ρ in (4.56).
q.e.d. Therefore, given x,
Corollary 4.7. Let the convex (relatively open) set
r (we assume r for convenience) such that
T arbitrary such that
then, for sufficiently small ε 1 > 0 the imputation
H exceeds x at coordinates τ 1 and τ r . For, clearly, ε 1 can be choosen such that ("strict") effectiveness is preserved, i.e., such that a To prove the somewhat more general claim at the beginning of this remark, if x is an imputation in H then x = αe + (1 − α) x with a suitable core element e and some x as above. Obviously αe + (1 − α)
• x serves to dominate x via the same a .
Thus we observe that any
• • 
Next, let τ be an undercutting sequence and let τ ∈ ∨
T such that τ = ( τ , τ ) is overshooting. Let a denote the relevant vector of the third type corresponding to τ . Then
that is, a is ("strictly") effective forx (butx is not necessarily a n imputation).
3. Finally, let τ = ( τ , τ ) and a be chosen as in the second item above.
Then, for
that is, a is ("strictly") effective for (the imputation)
Proof:
Obviously by our construction we have for the extremal points of H
thus item 1 is an immediate consequence.
nd STEP :
Next, regardingx as constructed in Definition 2.4 we havē 
We fix some
H. Then a candidate for a vNM-Stable set is provided by (5.7) 
Now we have
Proof:
We can more or less directly appeal to Theorem 3.11 of Part II as • H has just one extremal apart from the e T ρ . For completenes we repeat the argument.
Whenever a ⊕ is a relevant vector of the first or second kind (i.e. a separating pre-coalitions ), then we know that xa ⊕ ≥ 1 = v(a) holds true. Hence, no separating relevant vector induces a coalition that yields a domination. Therefore, we can restrict ourselves to domination via the nonseparating relevant vectors of the third type a described by items 2, 3 of Theorem 5.1. These vectorsā are given by a sequence ( τ 1 , . . . , τ r ,τ r ) by
There also the permuted versions a σ , but for simplicity we assume that domination takes place via some vector given by (5.9). Now, if domination takes place between x and y via a , then
First of all, consider the separating sequence obtained by omitting τ r , i.e., ( τ 1 , . . . , τ r ). Then, according to (5.11) and (5.15) we find by taking the sum ρ∈R\{r} x τρ + x τ r ≥ 1 on both sides and writing ξ :
Now we perform the same operation along the sequence ( τ 1 , . . . , τ r ) not including τ ρ . Now coordinate τ r is not involved and we have η := ρ∈R x τρ < 1 can be employed so that summation along the sequence now produces This contradiction proves that domination cannot take place inside H via a non-separating sequence resulting from a relevant vector described by (5.9).
q.e.d. T such that an imputation results. One should compare this to the Characterization Theorem in [4] and [5] .
The resemblance is striking. The above existence theorem again points out an imputation
• ϑ that is absolutely continuous w.r.t. λ 0 and has a density bounded by 1; exactly as in the previous Characterization Theorem. Other than previously however, one cannot choose all densities with these requirements but has to observe further restrictions.
At this stage we do not have a charcterization Theorem. Also, our result is limited to a piecewise constant density • λ 0 . These questions will have to be delt with in due time.
• •
